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Introduction 
 
The price of oil is one of the most familiar economic indicators for many people as it is 
highly related to our daily life. People are sensitive to changes in the price of gasoline 
or gas, for example. Moreover, the relationships between oil prices and economic 
cycles have been firmly linked to public expectation since the oil shocks of the 1970s. 
Therefore, changes in the oil price and their causes have been an interesting issue for 
economists. 
In the end of the 2000s, Kilian (American Economic Review, vol. 99, 2009, pp. 
1053-1069) indicated two more limitations found in most existing literature on the 
effects of changes in oil price on the global economy and prices. First, early studies on 
the relationship between oil price shocks and inflation assumed that oil price shocks 
were exogenous. In other words, these studies did not consider the possibility of 
reverse causality from the global economy through oil demand fluctuations. The 
second limitation is that previous analyses fail to distinguish the mechanisms 
underlying structural oil innovations. He states that it is impossible to accurately 
investigate the effects of higher oil prices on the economy without distinguishing what 
kind of structural shocks cause an increase in oil price in the first place. To solve these 
limitations, he proposed a two-step approach based on the structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR) model of the global oil market. Then he concludes that a rise in 
oil price may affect the real economy differently, depending on the underlying cause of 
the increase in the real price of oil. 
Following this contribution, the SVAR model has become a major tool to 
investigate the effects of different types of oil shocks. However, much remains 
unknown about the effects of oil price changes in countries other than the U.S. 
economy because many research focus on the U.S. economy. Moreover, whether and 
how the degree of dependency on imported oil affects the response of economies to oil 
price changes is still open question. In addition, since most previous literature sheds 
light on the response of aggregate price to higher oil price, the effects of changes in oil 
price on the prices of the detailed category of goods and services are largely unknown. 
Therefore, it is worth extending the existing studies on the effects of oil price 
shocks on economic activities in different way; major countries other than the United 
States, the degree of dependency on imported oil, and the prices of the detailed 
category of goods and services. This paper empirically analyzes impacts of oil price 
changes on macroeconomic activities from a variety of aspects as described above. An 
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outline of the abovementioned research is presented as follows. 
Chapter 1 investigates the effects of changes in oil price on three major 
economies, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, using a two-step 
approach based on a structural VAR model of the global crude oil market proposed by 
Kilian (2009). I find oil–specific demand shocks as well as aggregate demand shocks 
played an important role in the rise in the real price of oil since early 2002 and the 
subsequent sharp drops after the failure of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.. Moreover I 
have found that oil–specific demand shocks increase real GDP in Japan, which is very 
different from the United States and the United Kingdom where oil -specific demand 
shocks lead to reduction in real GDP. This difference possibly comes from the oil 
efficiency of Japanese products. 
Chapter 2 investigates the effects of oil price shocks on the production, price 
level, and exchange rate of eight important industrialized countries. The main finding 
is that the effect of oil price shocks on exchange rates also depends on where the 
changes fundamentally come from. We also conclude that the degree of dependency on 
imported oil is one of the important factors that affect the pattern of impulse responses.  
Chapter 3 investigates the dynamic effects of changes in oil price on the 
expenditure category consumer price index (CPI) in the United States and Japan. In 
this study, we apply a two-block structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model 
proposed by Kilian and Park (2009). Our results confirm that each expenditure 
category price index responded very differently to the same structural shock, and that 
whether changes in oil price function as a positive stimulus or a negative shock for the 
individual expenditure category prices also depends on the kind of underlying shock 
that drives the changes in oil price. Finally, our results also reveal that the manner in 
which changes in oil price affect each expenditure category price differ between the 
United States and Japan and these detailed-level differences may lead to 
aggregate-level differences in the price response of both countries to changes in oil 
price. 
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Chapter 1 
Investigating effects of oil price changes on the US, the UK 
and Japan 
 
1.1   Introduction 
This paper investigates the causes for wild fluctuations in oil prices since the 
mid-2000s. It also assesses, empirically, the effects of oil price shocks on the real 
economic activity and price development of three industrialized countries; the US, the 
UK, and Japan. In order to pursue my study, I have used the structural VAR model of 
the global crude oil market proposed by Kilian (2008). 
The price of oil is one of the most familiar economic indicators for many people 
as it is closely related to daily life. People are sensitive to changes in the price of 
gasoline or that of gas for example. Therefore, changes in the price of oil and their 
causes have been an interesting issue for economists. Early works reported that 
recessions in the US economy were related to exogenous political events in OPEC 
countries and subsequent rises in the price of oil. For example, Hamilton (1983, 1996) 
and Hooker (1996) show that most of the US recessions were preceded by increases in 
oil price
1
. The effect of the oil shock on the US economy has been studied by many 
economists from other aspects as well. For instance, Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson 
(1997) studied oil price shocks in terms of monetary policy. Finn (2000) investigated 
the role of exogenous oil price variation as a source of the US economic cycle. 
However, the writers of early literatures generally assumed exogeneity of oil 
shocks in studying the response of macroeconomic aggregates, when there may be 
reverse causality from the global economy through oil demand prices. This may bring 
inappropriate implications to policy makers. For example, a central bank would 
unambiguously raise interest rates in response to an endogenous demand-driven 
increase in the price of oil, but may face a difficult tradeoff between inflation and 
output when deciding policy against an exogenous cost-push, oil supply-shock. This 
point is closely related to the ongoing debate over whether it was oil supply shocks or 
contractionary monetary policy that caused the US recession in the late 1970s and 
1980s, e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997), Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004)
2
, 
                                            
1 Hamilton (1996) use “net oil price increase” as an oil price variables while Hooker 
(1996b), in his reply to Hamilton (1996), casts doubt on the theoretical and empirical 
validity of using “net oil price increase” to represent oil price shocks to the macro 
economy. 
2 Barsky and Kilian (2004) reports five recessions of the US which followed surges in 
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and Hamilton and Herrera (2004). Developing the works of Barsky and Kilian (2002, 
2004), Kilian (2008) established the structural VAR model of the global oil market in 
order to identify three underlying shocks in the global oil market: (1) oil supply 
shocks; shocks to the physical ability to produce oil, (2) aggregate demand shocks; 
shocks to the current demand for all industrial commodities which are determined by 
global macroeconomic conditions and (3) oil-specific demand shocks; shocks which 
cannot be explained based on oil supply shocks or aggregate demand shocks. 
Oil-specific demand shocks may for example, reflect precautionary demand
3
, which 
stems from an uncertainty about possible future shortfalls of oil. Based on this 
identification of structural shocks, Kilian concludes that a rise in oil price may affect 
the real economy differently, depending on the underlying cause of the increase in the 
real price of oil. Today, it is widely understood that the price of oil has been 
endogenous to global macroeconomic conditions and cannot be treated as exogenous. 
As seen in the previous studies above, most empirical literatures have mainly 
focused on the effects of changes in oil price on the US economy. In contrast, a 
relatively small number of studies have been done for other major economies, such as 
Japan. Much remains unknown about the response of those economies associated with 
oil price fluctuations. To my best knowledge, this article is the first study to make a 
comparison of the effects of changes in oil price on three major economies, the US, the 
UK, and Japan, taking the endogeneity of oil price into consideration. The main 
findings of this paper are as follows: First, the historical decomposition analysis allows 
me to conclude that oil-specific demand shocks as well as aggregate demand shocks 
played an important role in the rise in the real price of oil since early 2002 and the 
subsequent sharp drops after the failure of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.. Second, 
Kilian’s finding, the way oil price changes affect economy is different depending on 
where the changes fundamentally come from, is found not to be specific to US 
economy. It is also true for two other big industrialized economies; Japan and the UK. 
Third, I have found that oil-specific demand shocks increase real GDP in Japan, which 
is very different from the US and the UK where oil-specific demand shocks lead to 
reduction in real GDP. This difference possibly comes from the oil efficiency of 
                                                                                                                                
the price of oil: the recessions of November 1973, January 1980, July 1981, July 1990 
and March 2001. 
3 Alquist and Kilian (2007) conduct formal analysis on precautionary shocks. It is 
stated that precautionary demand varies depending on whether there is good access 
to inventory holdings of oil that may act like an insurance against a disturbance in oil 
supplies. 
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Japanese products. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides a 
detailed description of the data. Section 1.3 describes the econometric models used in 
this paper. Section 1.4 summarizes the empirical results, such as historical 
decomposition and measures the impact of the shocks on three economies by 
regressing three structural shocks on the growth of real GDP and CPI. Section 1.5 
proposes a conclusion. 
 
1.2.   Data Description 
Following Kilian (2008), I will consider the following three shocks as structural 
innovations to the global oil market; oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks and 
oil-specific demand shocks. Correspondingly, the variables which I will use are as 
follows: world crude oil production; world industrial production
4
; and West Texas 
Intermediate spot crude oil prices
5
. Details about the data such as its sources are 
described in the Table 1.1. 
 
The major differences described by Kilian (2008) are a choice of variable which 
represents global real economic activity and the length of the sample period. For the 
index of global real economic activity, Kilian (2008) constructs his original series 
based on dry cargo freight rates. To some extent, the fluctuations in freight rates 
captures the cycle of macroeconomic conditions. However, it possibly reflects some 
irrelevant information to real economic activity which is specific to the ship-freight 
market, such as weather condition and a demurrage. Therefore, I will use the index of 
world industrial production instead, taking the difference from its time trend to capture 
the development of global real economic activity well. As for the sample period, this 
paper covers 1973.1-2010.12
6
 which is the updated series of Kilian (2008), 
1973.1-2006.10. This allows me to reveal the underlying cause of the hike in oil price 
in summer 2008 and the subsequent sharp drop. 
                                            
4 The index of world industrial production is weighted sum of the industrial 
production of each OECD countries plus major six non-member economies; Brazil, 
China, India, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, and South Africa. The weight is 
calculated based on purchasing-power-parity valuation of each country.  
5 As for the oil price, the US refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil deflated by 
the US CPI is used in Kilian (2008). Instead of this series, I use WTI because besides 
the fact that WTI is considered one of the most popular international oil price index.  
6 The starting and ending date is dictated by the availability of the oil production data 
which is subscribed from the Oil and Gas Journal.  
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1.3.   Methodology 
     Similar to Kilian (2008), I will take the following two steps in my analytical 
framework. As a first step, the structural VAR model of the global crude oil market 
will be estimated in order to obtain a series of identified shocks. Secondly, by using 
these structural shocks obtained from the SVAR model, regression models will be 
estimated to assess the macroeconomic implication of the identified shocks for each 
country. 
 
1.3.1.   The Structural VAR model: Decomposing the Real Price of Oil 
Consider a restricted VAR model with 24 lags
7
 based on monthly data described 
in the previous section. The restricted VAR is represented as 
tit
i
it eXX  


24
1
  (1.1) 
where Xt = (∆prodt, IIPt, Pt)’ and et = (et∆
prod
t, et
IIP
, et
P)’. ∆prodt is the percentage 
change in global crude oil production and all variables are expressed in the natural 
log
8
. 
Then, the structural VAR is represented as  
tit
i
iit uXAAXA  


24
1
00   (1.2) 
In order to identify the structural shocks ut, it is assumed that A0
-1 
takes a 
specific form so that the reduced form errors et and the structural errors ut have the 
relationship as below. 
et =  
et
∆prod
et
IIP
et
P
 =  
a11 0 0
a21 a22 0
a31 a32 a33
  
ut
oil  supply  shock
ut
aggregate  demand  shock
ut
oil−specific  demand  shock
 =  A0
−1ut  (1.3) 
The assumptions on A0
-1
 are motivated as follows: First, oil supply shocks are 
innovations to oil production that are assumed not to respond to innovations to the 
demand for oil within the same month. i.e., the model postulates a vertical short-run 
                                            
7 Although the lag length indicated by AIC is 7, based on the fact that I use monthly 
series in model, I have decided to take 24 lags as Kilian (2008) does. We can avoid the 
problem of dynamic misspecification by taking 24 lags. The results based on 7 lags 
and 12 lags are very similar to the result based on 24 lags. 
8 The first difference of world production of oil, the level of index of economic activity 
and the level of real price of oil are used in Kilian (2008)’s original model. Stability 
test for the estimated VAR is also conducted. 
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supply curve of crude oil. Second, aggregate demand shocks are innovations to world 
industrial production that oil supply shocks cannot explain. With aggregate demand 
shocks, it is assumed that a rise in oil price, driven by shocks which are specific to the 
oil market, will not lower global world industrial production with a delay of at least a 
month. Lastly oil-specific demand shocks are innovations to the oil price that can be 
accounted for by neither the oil supply shocks nor aggregate demand shocks. 
Oil-specific demand shocks are, for example, supposed to reflect changes in 
precautionary demand, which come from uncertainty about future oil supply shortage. 
They are also supposed to reflect changes caused by speculative demand for oil. 
 
1.3.2.   Regression Model 
Next I will explain how the structural innovations in model (1.3) affect the CPI 
and real GDP growth in the US, the UK, and Japan. One complication that must be 
addressed is caused by the fact that real GDP is not available at monthly frequency. In 
addition, the series other than real GDP which are given at a monthly frequency cannot 
be aggregated to a quarterly frequency because at that frequency, the identifying 
assumptions used in estimating model (1.3) would no longer be credible
9
. In order to 
deal with the frequency not being consistent, I firstly average the monthly structural 
innovation for each quarter: 
,3,2,1,ˆ
3
1ˆ
3
1
,,  

ju
i
itjjt  (1.4) 
where u j,t,i  is the estimated disturbance for the jth structural innovation in the ith 
month of the tth quarter of the sample. Then by regressing the first difference of real 
GDP and the CPI on the averaged structural innovations with lags of innovations and 
constant respectively, I make it possible to investigate the impact of the shocks on each 
economy
10
:  
,3,2,1,ˆ
12
0
 

 jry jtijt
i
jijt   (1.5) 
                                            
9 The use of IIP for Japan is a possible clue to deal with the frequency problem because 
IIP is monthly data which is compatible with the short-run restrictions on my 
structural VAR models. However, I would rather see an effect of changes in oil price 
on whole economy which includes nonmanufacturing industries instead than 
manufacturing industries only. Thus quarterly real GDP data is used instead. 
10
 Note that regressions (1.5) and (1.6) rely on the assumption that within a given 
quarter there is no feedback from ∆y t and πt to ˆ i.e., these shocks can be treated 
as predetermined with respect to the growth of real GDP and the CPI. 
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,3,2,1,ˆ
12
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 

 jv jtijt
i
jijt 
 
(1.6) 
where  ∆y t  and πt  refers to the first difference of real GDP and that of the CPI 
respectively and r jt  and vjt  are errors
11
. In this regression model, because   jh  and 

jh
 are interpreted as an impulse response coefficients at horizon h, the number of 
lags is given by the maximum horizon of the impulse response function, which is 
defined as 12 quarters. 
 
1.4.   Empirical Results 
Although I used different data for all three variables in the SVAR from those 
used by Kilian (2008), the results of the estimation are similar to his. Figure 1.1 plots 
the historical evolution (expressed as annual averages for readability) of the structural 
shocks obtained from the model. As shown by Kilian (2008), there was no evidence of 
unanticipated global oil supply disruptions in 1978 or 1979 but there were large 
negative shocks to crude oil supply in 1980 and 1981, associated with the outbreak of 
the Iran–Iraq War. As for oil-specific demand shocks, there was also a large positive 
shock in 1979. This is consistent with the fact that there was growing uncertainty about 
future oil supply at that time because of successive political events such as the Iranian 
Revolution, the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Looking at the movements in the period from 2007 to the present, which is out 
of Kilian’s sample period, there is a huge negative shock to aggregate demand in 2008. 
It clearly reflects the worldwide economic depression that started with the failure of 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. on 15 September 2008. Another interesting point is 
that there is also a large negative disturbance to oil-specific demand. This is consistent 
with the view of market watchers
12
 that there was large outflow of speculative funds 
from the oil market which had increased the oil price more than fundamentally 
determined. The disturbance to the oil-specific demand can also be interpreted, if it is 
understood that with the sharp drop in demand for oil, the expectations of investors for 
future oil demand also decreased. 
 
                                            
11
 Those errors are potentially serially correlated. For right inference on the response 
estimates obtained by model (1.5) and (1.6), serial correlation problem is dealt with by 
using block bootstrap methods. Following Kilian(2008), block size 4 and 20,000 
bootstrap replications are used. 
12 In 2008, the writer worked as a market-watcher in the Bank of Japan. 
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1.4.1. Historical Decomposition of the Price of Oil 
Figure 1.2 plots a historical decomposition of the real price of oil into the 
contribution of the structural shocks. The cumulative effects of each structural shock 
on the real price of crude oil are indicated by the solid line in each panel. This 
historical decomposition obtained from my model is consistent with the findings of 
Kilian (2008) in that oil supply shocks made a small contribution to oil price 
movements, and that shocks due to aggregate demand and oil-specific shocks made far 
bigger contributions to the real price of oil. 
By taking a closer look at the recent developments to the cumulative effect of 
aggregate demand shock, we can see that the recent increase was driven largely by 
aggregate demand shocks. A large part of the surge in the real price of oil from the end 
of 2006 to the middle of 2008 in particular can be explained by this. It is also obvious 
that the level of the cumulative effect of aggregate demand shock on real price of oil in 
2010 has recovered close to pre-Lefman shock level and it has helped maintain oil 
price at a historically high level. Meanwhile, oil-specific demand shocks played an 
important role in the recent surge as well. It is obvious that oil-specific demand shocks 
also contributed largely to the surge in oil price in early 2008 and the subsequent sharp 
fall at the end of 2008. This is corresponding to the views that crude oil prices became 
high in the early part of 2008 partly due to the speculative inflow of funds, and partly 
due to the tightening of supply and demand conditions (see Bank of Japan 2008a) and 
that the price of oil fell rapidly at the end of 2008 due to increased risk aversion among 
investors reflecting disruptions in global financial markets (see Bank of Japan 2008b).  
 
1.4.2. The effect of Oil Price Shocks on the Economic Activity and Price 
Development 
Figures 1.3-1.5 summarize the responses of the level of real GDP and CPI to 
each of the three structural shocks. Both real GDP and CPI respond very differently to 
each of the three structural shocks in all three countries. This clearly shows that 
Kilian’s findings, the way oil price changes affect the US economy is very different 
depending on where the changes fundamentally come from, is also true for Japan and 
the UK. 
Oil supply disruptions cause a small decline in the US and Japan’s real GDP 
with some delays, whereas it leads to a small increase in the UK real GDP, but the 
one-standard error bands imply statistical insignificance. The corresponding effect on 
the level of the CPI is similar between the three economies. It is mostly flat and 
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statistically insignificant for the first 6 quarters and then becomes negative afterwards. 
Regarding an aggregate demand expansion, there is a similar pattern in the response of 
the US, the UK and Japan’s real GDP within first two years. After the second year, real 
GDP in the US and the UK become largely flat afterwards whereas Japan’s real GDP 
keeps its level above initial state. At the end of the third year, the response of the US 
and the UK turns to be negative, which is statistically significant. Meanwhile, this 
shock causes a statistically significant increase in the price level of the US and the UK. 
In contrast, interestingly, it causes neither a statistically significant increase nor a 
decrease in the price level of Japan. A positive oil-market specific demand shock leads 
to a slight decline in the US and the UK real GDP. On the other hand, in Japan, this 
shock leads to a sustained increase in real GDP that reaches its maximum at the 10th 
quarter. This increase is statistically significant in the first three and a half years but 
becomes statistically insignificant after that. The corresponding effect on the level of 
the CPI is similar between the three economies. It results in a sustained and highly 
statistically significant increase. 
The result suggests a fair degree of similarity in the real GDP and CPI responses 
between the US and the UK. The biggest difference between those two economies and 
the Japanese economy is that oil-specific demand shocks have a positive impact on 
Japanese GDP, while it results in reduction in the US and the UK real GDP. This result 
seems to confirm the findings of recent studies, stating that the impact of oil price 
increases on Japan’s economy are relatively small or even positive and very different 
from other oil-importing countries. For example, Fukunaga, Hirakata and Sudo (2009) 
compared industry-level effects of oil price change in the US and Japan and found that 
the increase in the price of oil caused a global demand shift, especially in automobiles, 
towards more oil-efficent products made in Japan and thus it increases production in 
Japan. In this sense, the positive response of real GDP in Japan to the oil-specific 
demand shock can be explained in part by the result of a global demand shift towards 
oil efficient products made in Japan. 
 
1.5.   Conclusion 
The main results can be summarized as below: First, by extending the sample 
period from Kilian (2008), I have found that oil-specific demand shocks as well as 
aggregate demand shocks played an important role in the wild fluctuations in oil prices 
since the mid-2000s. Second, I investigated the impact of changes in the price of oil on 
three industrialized economies. I have shown that the statement that the way oil price 
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changes affect economy is very different depending on where the changes 
fundamentally come from is also true for Japan and the UK. The most interesting 
finding is that oil-specific demand shocks increase real GDP in Japan, which is very 
different from the US and the UK where oil-specific demand shocks lead to reduction 
in real GDP. This difference possibly comes from the oil efficiency of Japanese 
products. In this sense, a rise in the price of oil does not necessarily have a negative 
impact on Japan’s economy, which is in contrast to the public belief that an increase in 
oil price has negative consequences for the lives of Japanese people.   
12 
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Table 1.1   Data description and sources 
 
Variable Description Data source 
World Production of Oil (prod) Original Series. Oil and Gas Journal
13
 
World Industrial Production 
(IIP) 
Seasonally adjusted. 
Gap from linear trend. 
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development 
Real oil price (p) Original Series of WTI 
deflated by the US CPI. 
Federal Reserve Bank 
Japanese Real GDP  Seasonally adjusted. Cabinet Office of Japan 
The US Real GDP Bureau of Economic Analysis 
The UK Real GDP Office for National Statistics 
Japanese CPI Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development 
The UK CPI 
The US CPI 
 
  
                                            
13
 I have subscribed this data from Oil and Gas Journal. 
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Figure 1.1: Historical evolution of the structural shocks (1973-2010) 
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Figure 1.2: Historical decomposition of real oil price s (1973-2010) 
 
Notes: Estimation based on model (1.2).  
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Figure 1.3: Cumulative responses of Japan’s real GDP and CPI to each structural 
shock 
 
Notes: Estimation based on model (1.5) and (1.6). One and two-standard error bands are 
shown by dashed line and dotted line respectively. 
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Figure 1.4: Cumulative responses of the US real GDP and CPI to each structural 
shock  
 
Notes: Estimation based on model (1.5) and (1.6). One and two-standard error bands are 
shown by dashed line and dotted line respectively. 
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Figure 1.5: Cumulative responses of the UK real GDP and CPI to each structural 
shock 
 
Notes: Estimation based on model (1.5) and (1.6). One and two-standard error bands are 
shown by dashed line and dotted line respectively. 
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Chapter 2 
On the Influence of Oil Price Shocks on Economic Activity, 
Inflation, and Exchange Rates 
 
2.1.   Introduction 
The price of oil is one of the most familiar economic indicators for many people 
as it is highly related to our daily life. People are sensitive to changes in the price of 
gasoline or gas, for example. Moreover, the relationships between oil prices and 
economic cycles have been firmly linked to public expectation since the oil shocks of 
the 1970s. Therefore, changes in the oil price and their causes have been an interesting 
issue for economists. Early works (Hamilton, 1983, 1996; Hooker, 1996) reported that 
recessions in the US economy were related to exogenous political events in 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries and subsequent 
rises in the price of oil. For example, Hamilton (1983, 1996) and Hooker (1996) show 
that most of the US recessions were preceded by oil price increases. The effects of oil 
shock on the US economy have also been studied from other viewpoints. For instance, 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) studied oil price shocks in terms of monetary 
policy. Other authors have intensively studied the effects of oil price shocks on the 
exchange rates. According to De Gregorio and Wolf (1994), the currencies of 
commodity exporters tend to move along with commodity prices. However, some 
authors (Habib & Kalamova, 2007) showed that such relationships are not always alike. 
Habib and Kalamova (2007), who analyze the exchange rate of three major oil 
exporters (Norway, Saudi Arabia, and Russia), find a robust relationship with oil prices 
only for Russia. 
The problem with early studies (e.g., Hamilton, 1983, 1996; Hooker, 1996) is 
that they generally assumed exogeneity of oil shocks (when there may be reverse 
causality from the global economy through oil demand prices) while studying the 
response of macroeconomic aggregates. This may raise inappropriate implications for 
policy makers. For example, a central bank would unambiguously increase interest 
rates in response to an endogenous demand-driven increase in the price of oil, but may 
face a difficult trade-off between inflation and output when considering policies 
against an exogenous cost-push oil supply shock. 
To solve the problem described above, Kilian (2009) established a two-step 
approach based on the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model of the global oil 
market. He proposed a method to decompose shocks to the real price of oil into three 
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components: (1) oil supply shocks, or shocks to the physical ability to produce oil; (2) 
aggregate demand shocks, or shocks to the current demand for oil determined by 
global macroeconomic conditions; and (3) oil-specific demand shocks, or shocks that 
may, for example, reflect precautionary demand, which stems from an uncertainty 
about possible future shortfalls of oil. Based on this identification of structural shocks, 
Kilian (2009) concludes that a rise in oil price may affect the real economy differently, 
depending on the underlying cause of the increase in the real price of oil. Following 
this contribution, the structural VAR model has become a major tool to investigate the 
effects of different types of oil shocks. For instance, Kilian and Park (2009) apply the 
structural VAR method to control for reverse causality between the price of oil and 
stock prices. They report that since the 1970s the price of oil has responded to some of 
the same economic forces that drove stock prices and cause and effect were not well 
defined in regressions of stock returns on oil price changes. They showed that the 
reaction of the US real stock return to an oil price shock differs greatly depending on 
whether the change in the price of oil is driven by demand or supply shocks in the oil 
market. 
As stated above, there is a large empirical literature on the effects of changes in 
oil price on macroeconomic activity However, much of those papers focus on the U.S. 
economy. Much remains unknown about the effects of oil price changes in countries 
other than the U.S. economy. Therefore, it is worth assessing empirically the effects of 
oil price shocks on important industrialized countries; their magnitudes, transmission 
mechanisms, and historical changes. In addition to this, whether and how the degree of 
dependency on imported oil affects the response of economies to oil price changes is 
still open question. Therefore, it is also important to think about the relationship 
between oil price and the exchange rate at this timing. 
The first objective of this paper is to assess the differences as well as similarities 
in the response of the selected industrialized economies to structural oil price shocks. 
The second purpose of the present paper is to find out whether oil shocks matter for 
exchange rates. In other words, we are particularly interested in how the impact of 
each shock is different for oil exporters and importers. In order to pursue our study, we 
carry out the two-step approach proposed by Kilian (2009).  
We extend the existing studies in two ways. First, we assess the effects of oil 
price shocks not only on real economic activity, as reflected in the GDP and CPI, for 
example, but also on the exchange rate. In particular, we are interested in whether the 
effects of oil price shocks on exchange rates depend on the fundamental source of 
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shocks, as real economic activity does. Second, unlike most previous studies 
(Hamilton, 1983, 1996; Hooker, 1996; Kilian, 2009; Kilian & Park, 2009), which 
focus on the US economy, we compare the effects of oil price shocks across other 
important industrial countries, both exporters and importers of oil. As far as our 
knowledge goes, this is the first study to consider whether the degree of dependency 
on imported oil affects response patterns. 
The rest of this study is organized as following. Section 2.2 provides a detailed 
description of the data. Section 2.3 describes the econometric models used in this paper. 
Section 2.4 summarizes the empirical results. Section 2.5 concludes the study. 
 
2.2.   Data Description 
Table 2.1 presents an overview of the data set and its sources. This includes 
monthly index of industrial production (IIP), consumer price index (CPI), and real 
effective exchange rate (REER) data of eight countries (Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The sample period 
extends from December 1974 to December 2010. For the oil market, we use world 
crude oil production, world industrial production
14
, and West Texas Intermediate spot 
crude oil prices
15
 to identify structural shocks. The major difference from Kilian’s 
(2009) original work is in regard to the choice of a variable to represent global real 
economic activity. Kilian (2009) constructs his original series based on dry cargo 
freight rates as the index of global real economic activity. However, these may reflect 
some irrelevant information on real economic activity that is specific to the 
ship-freight market, such as weather condition and demurrage. Therefore, we use the 
index of world industrial production, instead, to appropriately capture the development 
of global real economic activity. 
Table 2.2 presents the oil production-to-consumption ratios for each country 
over the period 1980 to 2010. The table indicates that the less the ratio, the more 
dependent the country is on imported oil. Canada, the United Kingdom, and Norway 
are considered oil-abundant countries as they produce more oil than they consume, 
                                            
14 The index of world industrial production is the weighted sum of the industrial 
production of all OECD countries, plus six non-member economies: Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, Russia, and South Africa. 
15 As for the oil price, the U.S. refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil is used in 
Kilian (2009). Instead, we use the WTI, which is one of the most popular international 
oil price indices. 
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whereas Italy, France, Germany, and Japan are oil-deficient countries. The United 
States also imports foreign oil, but the degree of its dependency on oil imports is 
relatively low. 
 
2.3.   Methodology 
Following Kilian (2009), we adopt a two-step approach described as follows. 
First, we estimate the structural VAR model of the global crude oil market to obtain a 
series of identified shocks. Second, we estimate regression models, using these 
structural shocks, to assess the macroeconomic implication of the identified shocks for 
each country. 
 
2.3.1. The Structural VAR Model: Identifying Structural Shocks 
Consider a restricted VAR model with 24 lags
16
 represented as 
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(2.1) 
where Xt includes the percentage change in global crude oil production, a 
detrended series of world industrial production, and the real oil price in dollars, 
deflated using the US CPI. 
Next, the structured VAR model is represented as follows: 
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(2.2) 
The structural shock ut includes oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, 
and oil-specific demand shocks, identified under the Cholesky recursive scheme. 
 
2.3.2. Regression Model 
Second, by regressing the log change in the IIP, CPI, and REER on the average 
structural innovations, with their respective lags and constants, we allow an 
investigation into how the structural shocks in model (2.2) affect each economy: 
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(2.3) 
                                            
16 Although the lag length indicated by the Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) is 7, 
we decided to use 24 lags as Kilian (2009) did, considering the fact that we use 
monthly series in the model. We can avoid the dynamic misspecification problem by 
using 24 lags. The results based on 7 and 12 lags are very similar to those based on 24 
lags. 
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where 𝑢 𝑗 ,𝑡 ,𝑖  is the estimated disturbance for the jth structural innovation in the 
ith month of the tth quarter of the sample period and 𝑟 𝑗𝑡 , 𝑣𝑗𝑡 , and 𝑠𝑗𝑡  are errors. To 
obtain correct inferences from the response estimates, we deal with the serial 
correlation problem using the block bootstrap method with block size 4 and 20,000 
bootstrap replications. In this regression model, because  jh ,

jh , and  jh  are 
interpreted as impulse response coefficients at horizon h, the number of lags is 
determined by the maximum horizon of the impulse response function, which is set to 
12 quarters. 
 
2.4.   Empirical Results 
Figures 2.1–2.8 summarize each country’s IIP, CPI, and REER responses to each 
of the three structural shocks. 
 
2.4.1. The United States 
Unanticipated oil supply disruptions cause a statistically significant appreciation 
in REER. The corresponding effects on IIP and CPI are largely flat and mostly 
statistically insignificant. Aggregate demand increase leads to a temporary rise in IIP 
in the first year and a half, followed by a decline below the starting point. This IIP 
response pattern is consistent with that of most other oil-abundant countries. 
Unanticipated oil-specific demand expansion results in a persistent CPI increase, and 
the REER also appreciates as a result. The appreciation in REER is statistically 
significant between the fourth and the eleventh quarter. 
 
2.4.2. The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, oil supply shocks cause a statistically significant decline 
in REER below the initial level from the sixth quarter onward, resulting in a gradual 
decline in CPI as well. The reduction in CPI becomes statistically significant in the 
tenth quarter. Unanticipated aggregate demand expansion causes a significant increase 
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in IIP during the first five quarters, followed by a decline below the initial level. At the 
same time, this shock also significantly appreciates REER, but the lower one-standard 
error band implies statistical significance for the first six quarters only. Oil-specific 
demand shocks lead to a statistically significant decrease in IIP between the second 
and the ninth quarter. The shocks also provide a sustained level of shifts in CPI. 
 
2.4.3. Canada 
The response patterns look quite similar to those of the United States. The major 
difference is that aggregate as well as oil-specific demand shocks cause statistically 
significant appreciation in REER in the first year. In addition, unlike in the United 
States, unanticipated supply shocks have no statistically significant impact on REER. 
 
2.4.4. Norway 
The impact of oil supply shocks causes a significant increase in REER, while IIP 
experienced a temporary reduction in the first year after a supply shock. These shocks 
also shift the CPI upward, although the effects are statistically insignificant. Aggregate 
demand shocks cause the REER to increase significantly in the first year and after the 
eighth quarter. Oil-specific demand shocks create a statistically significant impact only 
on CPI. 
 
2.4.5. France 
The responses of France differ from those of oil-abundant countries in that oil 
supply shocks lead to a sustained reduction in France’s IIP and REER. Most responses 
are statistically significant. The second major difference is that unanticipated aggregate 
demand expansion results in a sustained increase in IIP. Although the stimulus effect 
wears out gradually, IIP does not go under the initial level unlike in oil-abundant 
countries. 
 
2.4.6. Italy 
Italy’s response patterns are quite similar to those of France. Unexpected oil 
supply shocks shift Italy’s IIP and REER downward. At the same time, aggregate 
demand shocks lead to a sustained IIP increase as in the French case. A unique feature 
in Italy is that oil supply disruptions lower IIP and increase CPI much more than in 
France. 
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2.4.7. Germany 
Oil supply disruptions cause a temporary depreciation in REER in the first year. 
At the same time, the disruptions also result in an IIP reduction two years after the 
initial shock. The impact of unanticipated aggregate demand expansion causes a 
significant increase in IIP. The response of IIP is positive in all horizons, which is 
unique among the eight countries. On the other hand, the impact on CPI and REER is 
not statistically significant. Oil-specific demand shocks lead to a statistically 
significant increase in CPI as in other countries. However, the increase is much lower 
than in other countries. 
 
2.4.8. Japan 
Oil supply shocks cause no significant effects on Japan’s IIP, CPI, and REER. 
Aggregate demand shocks lead to a sharp increase in IIP, which reaches its maximum 
two quarters later. The increase is the largest among the sample countries. On the other 
hand, CPI does not show a significant rise in all horizons. These results are similar to 
the German case. Unanticipated oil-specific increase results in a statistically 
significant increase in CPI, but the amount of increase is relatively low. This pattern is 
also similar to the German case. Unlike in other countries, the shocks have a positive 
impact on IIP, which is a clear anomaly in Japan. 
 
2.5.   Conclusion 
We investigate the effects of oil price shocks on the exchange rate and real 
economic activity of the important industrialized countries using Kilian’s (2009) 
method. The main results can be summarized as follows: First, we showed that the 
effect of oil price shocks on exchange rates also depends on where the changes 
fundamentally come from. We extend Kilian’s (2009) method, which focuses on the 
effect of oil price shocks on the real GDP and CPI of the United States, to shed light on 
the transmission effects of oil price shocks on the exchange rate. Second, we reveal 
that the degree of dependency on imported oil is one of the important factors that 
affect the impulse response pattern. For instance, we find no evidence that oil supply 
shocks cause no long-run effect on IIP in oil-abundant countries (Canada, Norway, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States) and that the shocks lead to a statistically 
significant decline in IIP in countries with high dependency on imported oil (France, 
Italy, and Germany) in the long run. These results can be interpreted to mean that, 
when facing unanticipated oil supply shocks, oil-deficient countries intentionally lower 
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production levels to save oil, realizing that it would be difficult to import oil whatever 
the price demanded. In addition, positive aggregate demand expansion initially 
increases production in all countries but Norway. Over time, the stimulus effect wears 
out gradually, but producers in countries with high dependency on imported oil 
maintain their production levels above the initial state. On the contrary, production in 
oil-abundant countries turns out to be negative in around two years after the shock. To 
the best of our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to show, using the two-step 
SVAR method, how the degree of dependency on imported oil affects response 
patterns. 
How the effects of oil price shocks differ in emerging countries is a topic worth 
investigating in a future research study. Moreover, time-varying-VAR models that 
incorporate possible structural breaks in the global oil market are also promising 
methods to deepen our understanding of the transmission mechanisms of oil price 
shocks. 
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Table 2.1: Data sources 
 
Variable Data source 
Industrial Production(IIP) 
Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development(OECD) 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
World Industrial Production 
Real effective exchange rate Bank for International Settlements(BIS) 
World Production of Oil Oil and Gas Journal 
WTI crude oil price Federal Reserve Bank 
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Table 2.2: Dependency on imported-oil 
 
 
Notes: Average ratio of oil production to consumption during the 1980 to 2010. 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
 
  
Norway UK Canada US Italy France Germany Japan
10.215 1.309 1.302 0.543 0.066 0.050 0.048 0.017
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Figures 2.1: Cumulative responses of IIP, CPI and REER to each structural shock, 
the United States 
  
Notes: Estimation based on model (2.2) - (2.4). One and two-standard error bands are 
shown by dashed line and dotted line respectively.  
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Figures 2.2: Cumulative responses of IIP, CPI and REER to each structural shock, 
the United Kingdom 
  
Notes: Estimation based on model (2.2) - (2.4). One and two-standard error bands are 
shown by dashed line and dotted line respectively.  
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Figures 2.3: Cumulative responses of IIP, CPI and REER to each structural shock, 
Canada 
  
Notes: Estimation based on model (2.2) - (2.4). One and two-standard error bands are 
shown by dashed line and dotted line respectively.  
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Figures 2.4: Cumulative responses of IIP, CPI and REER to each structural shock, 
Norway 
  
Notes: Estimation based on model (2.2) - (2.4). One and two-standard error bands are 
shown by dashed line and dotted line respectively.  
  
35 
 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
II
P
Crude Oil Supply Shock
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
II
P
Aggregate Demand Shock
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
II
P
Oil-Market Specific Demand Shock
Quarters
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
C
P
I
Crude Oil Supply Shock
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
C
P
I
Aggregate Demand Shock
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
C
P
I
Oil-Market Specific Demand Shock
Quarters
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
R
E
E
R
Crude Oil Supply Shock
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
R
E
E
R
Aggregate Demand Shock
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
R
E
E
R
Oil-Market Specific Demand Shock
Quarters
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 2.5: Cumulative responses of IIP, CPI and REER to each structural shock, 
France 
  
Notes: Estimation based on model (2.2) - (2.4). One and two-standard error bands are 
shown by dashed line and dotted line respectively.  
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Figures 2.6: Cumulative responses of IIP, CPI and REER to each structural shock, 
Italy 
 
Notes: Estimation based on model (2.2) - (2.4). One and two-standard error bands are 
shown by dashed line and dotted line respectively.  
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Figures 2.7: Cumulative responses of IIP, CPI and REER to each structural shock, 
Germany 
  
Notes: Estimation based on model (2.2) - (2.4). One and two-standard error bands are 
shown by dashed line and dotted line respectively.  
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Figures 2.8: Cumulative responses of IIP, CPI and REER to each structural shock, 
Japan 
  
Notes: Estimation based on model (2.2) - (2.4). One and two-standard error bands are 
shown by dashed line and dotted line respectively.  
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Chapter 3 
The Effects of Oil Price Shocks on Expenditure Category CPI 
 
3.1. Introduction 
There is a large body of literature that reports on the effects of oil price shocks on 
aggregate price. However, prices of a detailed category of goods and services have 
often been ignored in discussions of the effects of an increase in oil price. In this study, 
we empirically analyze the impact of higher oil price on detailed expenditure 
categories as well as aggregate price. Based on a two-block structural vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model proposed by Kilian and Park (2009), we investigate the 
dynamic effects of oil price shocks on the expenditure category consumer price index 
(CPI) for the United States and Japan. 
Investigating the role of changes in oil price in the economy has been a 
significant issue for economists as oil price has a direct effect on the price of gasoline 
or gas, which further has an impact on almost every aspect of the economy. With 
respect to the interplay between oil price shock and macro economic activity, many 
early works reported that recessions in the US economy were related to exogenous 
political events in Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and 
subsequent rises in the price of oil. For example, Hamilton (1983, 1996) and Hooker 
(1996) conclude that most of the US recessions were preceded by increases in oil price. 
Some researchers (Bernanke et al., 1997; Blanchard and Galí, 2007) studied the effects 
of changes in oil price on price development and industry output. Bernanke et al. 
(1997) studied oil price shocks in terms of inflation, output, and monetary policy. 
Blanchard and Galí (2007) examined the reason for the reduction in the impacts of oil 
price shocks on inflation as compared to that in the 1970s. However, these studies 
focus on aggregate price; the effects of changes in oil price on the prices of detailed 
category of goods and services remains largely unknown. 
Further, Kilian (2009) indicated two more limitations found in most existing 
literature on the effects of changes in oil price on the global economy and prices. First, 
early studies (Hamilton, 1983, 1996; Hooker, 1996, 1999) on the relationship between 
oil price shocks and inflation assumed that oil price shocks were exogenous. In other 
words, these studies did not consider the possibility of reverse causality from the 
global economy through oil demand fluctuations. For example, Hooker (1999) 
analyzes the relationship between oil price and the inflation in the United States by 
using a Phillips curve framework with a structural break. He concludes that after 1980, 
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changes in oil price do not appear to have a strong impact on core inflation. The 
second limitation, addressed in Killian (2009), is that previous analyses fail to 
distinguish the mechanisms underlying structural oil innovations. Killian states that it 
is impossible to accurately investigate the effects of higher oil prices on the economy 
without distinguishing what kind of structural shocks cause an increase in oil price in 
the first place. 
In order to provide further insight into the relationship between oil price and the 
economy, Kilian (2009) established a structural decomposition of the price of oil into 
the following three components: (1) oil supply shocks, or shocks to the physical ability 
to produce oil; (2) aggregate demand shocks, or shocks to the global demand for all 
industrial commodities; and (3) oil-specific demand shocks, or shocks that are specific 
to the global oil market. The latter structural shocks may reflect precautionary demand, 
which is caused by, for example, an uncertainty regarding possible future shortfalls of 
oil. Applying this identification of structural shocks to a structural VAR model of the 
global oil market, Kilian (2009) concludes that an unanticipated increase in oil price 
may have very different effects on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and CPI in the 
United States, depending on the underlying cause of the higher oil price. Specifically, 
his findings can be summarized as follows: Firstly, oil supply shocks decrease GDP 
and have little impacts on the price. Secondly, unanticipated demand expansion causes 
a temporary increase on GDP and shifts price level upward. Lastly, positive 
oil-specific shocks decrease GDP and increase CPI. 
Following this contribution, the structural VAR model of the global oil market 
proposed by Kilian (2009) has been widely applied to many other oil-related topics. 
For example, Kilian et al. (2009) studied the impact of structural oil shocks on the 
balance of payments. Alquist and Kilian (2010) focused on the effect of demand and 
supply shocks in the global crude oil market on the oil futures markets. Kilian and 
Park (2009) constructed a two-block structural VAR model that included the global oil 
market block and the US stock market block in order to explore the differences in the 
responses of industry-level stock returns to changes in oil price.  
As stated above, most previous literature sheds light on the response of 
aggregate price to higher oil price. However, the effects of changes in oil price on the 
prices of the detailed category of goods and services are largely unknown. Therefore, 
in this study, our objective is to examine the impact of higher oil price on detailed 
expenditure category prices as well as aggregate price in terms of their magnitudes, 
transmission mechanisms, and historical changes. More specifically, we are interested 
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in determining whether changes in oil price function as positive or negative shocks on 
the individual expenditure category prices and which expenditure category index plays 
an important role in the response of the aggregate index to changes in oil price. In 
addition, we compare the United States and Japan to enhance our understanding of the 
transmission mechanisms of changes in oil price. For this purpose, we apply a 
two-block structural VAR approach proposed by Kilian and Park (2009).  
We extend the existing studies by using detailed expenditure category prices as 
well as the aggregate price in order to conduct a detailed investigation of the 
transmission mechanisms of changes in oil price. To the best of our knowledge, this 
study is the first attempt to investigate the effects of structural shocks to the global oil 
market on detailed expenditure category prices. Moreover, unlike most previous 
studies, which focus on the US economy, we compare the effects of oil price shocks in 
the United States and Japan.  
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. In Section 3.2, 
we provide a detailed description of the data for the global oil market and the CPI. In 
Section 3.3, we describe our empirical framework. In Section 3.4, we summarize our 
empirical results, and in Section 3.5 we conclude the study. 
 
3.2. Data Description 
The global oil market 
Table 3.1 presents an overview of the data set used in this study and its sources. In 
order to represent the global oil market block, we use world crude oil production, 
world industrial production, and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) spot crude oil prices 
to identify structural shocks. The last two variables are different from those used in 
Kilian (2009). For determining real global economic activity, Kilian (2009) constructs 
his original series based on dry cargo freight rates. However, we use the index of world 
industrial production, the weighted sum of the industrial production of all OECD 
countries as well as six non-member economies—Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, 
Russia, and South Africa—because dry cargo freight rates may include some irrelevant 
information on real economic activity that is specific to the ship-freight market, such 
as weather conditions and demurrage. For the oil price, Kilian (2009) uses the refiner 
acquisition cost of imported crude oil in the United States. Instead, we use the WTI as 
it is one of the most popular international oil price indices. The sample period is from 
December 1974 to December 2010.  
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Consumer Price Index 
The US CPI data used in this study is available on the Web site of the Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED)
17
 or The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
18
. The CPI data for 
Japan can be downloaded from the Web site of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications
19
. 
In order to analyze the effects of changes in oil price on detailed expenditure 
category prices, we used category-level data as well as the aggregate price index. 
However, rather than reviewing all individual price indexes, we focus on nine major 
groups in the expenditure category. In particular, for the United States, we use food 
and beverages, housing, apparel, transportation, medical care, recreation, education 
and communications, and other goods and services. As the corresponding expenditure 
category for Japan, we use food, housing, clothes and footwear, medical care, 
transportation and communication, culture and recreation, education, and 
miscellaneous. 
In addition, to obtain a better understanding of the price developments of food 
and beverages, housing, transportation, and medical care, we analyze their lower-level 
indexes as well. The issue is that the definitions for some sub-categories differ slightly 
between Japan and the United States. Specifically, there are some lower-level indexes 
that are published only in the United States. In this case, we calculated these 
undisclosed indexes for Japan from other indexes and the expenditure weights that are 
available. For example, the food at home index is undisclosed in Japan whereas the 
food at home index and food away home index are available. With the respective 
expenditure weights for each index, we obtained Japan’s food at home index by 
subtracting the food away home and alcoholic beverages indexes from the upper-level 
food index. Table 3.2 presents the list of price indexes used in this study.  
 
3.3. Methodology 
Following Kilian and Park (2009), we estimate a structural VAR model for the United 
States or Japan’s CPI to measure demand and supply shocks in the global oil market. 
To this end, our model has two-block structures: the global oil market block and the 
United States or Japan’s CPI block. 
Description of the structural VAR model 
                                            
17 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ 
18 http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ 
19 http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/index.htm 
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We consider a restricted VAR model with 24 lags based on monthly data, as described 
in section 2. The restricted VAR is represented as 
 
(3.1) 
where Xt includes the percentage change in global oil production, a detrended series of 
world industrial production, WTI oil price in dollars, and the consumer price index for 
the United States or Japan. Further, et denotes the reduced-form VAR innovations. The 
VAR model has a two-year lag because of the possibility that some shocks may be 
delayed by over a year. 
Then, the structural representation of this VAR model is given by 
 (3.2) 
where ut is the vector of structural innovations. In order to identify the structural 
shocks ut, it is assumed that A0
-1
 takes a specific form so that the reduced form errors et 
and the structural errors ut have a specific relationship, as described below. 
𝑒𝑡 =
 
 
 
𝑒1𝑡
∆𝑜𝑖𝑙  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑒2𝑡
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑  𝐼𝐼𝑃        
𝑒3𝑡
𝑊𝑇𝐼  𝑜𝑖𝑙  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑒4𝑡
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  𝐶𝑃𝐼  
 
 
=  
𝑎11 0 0 0
𝑎21 𝑎22 0 0
𝑎31 𝑎32 𝑎33 0
𝑎41 𝑎42 𝑎43 𝑎44
 
 
 
 
𝑢1𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙  𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦  𝑠𝑕𝑜𝑐𝑘                         
𝑢2𝑡
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑠𝑕𝑜𝑐𝑘    
𝑢3𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙−𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐  𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑠𝑕𝑜𝑐𝑘
𝑢4𝑡
𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟  𝑠𝑕𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠  𝑡𝑜  𝐶𝑃𝐼                  
 
 
= 𝐴 0
−1ut
 
(3.3) 
The motivation of the identifying assumptions on A0
-1
 will be discussed later. 
 
The global oil market block 
The global oil market block comprises three equations—global oil production, global 
industrial production, and oil price. The following are the assumptions related to the 
global oil market block: First, oil supply shocks are innovations to world oil 
production that are treated as predetermined with respect to shocks to oil demand. 
More precisely, the model assumes a vertical short-run supply curve of oil. Next, 
aggregate demand shocks are innovations to world industrial production that cannot be 
accounted for by oil supply shocks. Further, aggregate demand shocks also indicate 
that an increase in the price of oil stemming from oil-specific demand shocks will not 
cause a decrease in the level of global industrial production within a given month, but 
may only cause a supply delay of at least a month. Lastly, oil-specific demand shocks 
are innovations to the price of oil that can be explained neither by demand nor by 
supply shocks. In other words, oil-specific demand shocks are assumed to reflect 
changes caused by speculative demand for oil or changes in precautionary demand, 
tit
i
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
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which, for example, are caused by uncertainty regarding future oil supply shortage.  
 
The consumer price index block 
The CPI block comprises only one equation, the consumer price index for the United 
States and Japan. The restriction of the last column of A0
-1 
implies that CPI is not 
supposed to react to shocks to the global oil production, global industrial production, 
and oil price within the same month. In other words, while CPI is assumed to respond 
to all three structural oil shocks, ε4t does not affect the global oil market with a delay of 
at least one month.  
 
3.4. Empirical Results 
In this section, we report the estimation results for the CPI block. First, we investigate 
aggregate price developments for the United States and Japan. Then, we focus on 
detailed expenditure category prices and the nature of the transmission of oil price 
shocks to the CPI. The results below are based on running VAR model (3.2) on indexes 
for expenditure category prices for each country. 
 
The effect of oil price shocks on aggregate price  
Figures 3.1 illustrate each country’s aggregate price responses to each of the three 
structural shocks. 
The pattern of responses to unanticipated oil supply disruptions appears similar 
between two countries. We find some evidence that oil supply shocks cause a slight 
temporary increase in the level of aggregate price. In fact, the price level declines in 
the long run, which supports Kilian (2009)’s findings. In both countries, the peak 
response occurs in the first year, followed by a gradual decline below the initial level. 
Most responses are statistically insignificant. 
Aggregate demand shocks lead to a significant increase in the aggregate price 
index for both countries, but the amount of increase is relatively larger in the United 
States. Moreover, in the United States, the shocks cause a sustained level of shifts in 
aggregate price, which is statistically significant in all horizons; in Japan, the lower 
one-standard error band implies statistical significance for the first three years only. 
Unanticipated oil-specific demand shocks lead to a temporary rise in aggregate 
price in the first two and a half years, followed by a decline below the starting point. 
Unlike the United States, the corresponding effects on Japan’s aggregate price index 
are a significant increase for the first three and a half years. Moreover, the amount of 
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increase is relatively larger than in the United States. This difference may reflect the 
fact that the oil-specific demand shock leads a global demand shift towards Japan’s oil 
efficient products, especially in automobiles. And the price level in Japan increases 
under the good economic performance. 
 
Oil price shocks on expenditure category prices 
Figures 3.2–3.9 illustrate the estimated cumulative responses of expenditure category 
prices of the 16 selected categories in the United States and Japan to the 3 structural 
shocks identified in the global oil market block. 
As in the response pattern of the aggregate price index, the pattern of responses 
to oil supply disruptions appears similar in many categories in the United States and 
Japan. For example, in both the United States and Japan, oil supply innovations cause 
a sustained and highly statistically significant decrease in the level of food at home, 
alcoholic beverages, and household furnishings and operations indexes. However, the 
magnitude and persistence of the effects in some categories differ greatly among two 
countries. 
For example, oil supply disruptions significantly lower the level of shelter index 
in the United States. This may be reasoned by that oil supply shock can be considered 
as negative to economic activity according to the findings of Kilian (2009), thus it is 
natural to think that shelter index decrease in recession period. On the other hand, they 
have no significant effect on the level of shelter index in Japan. This difference may 
reflect the fact shelter index in the United States, by its calculation method, is more 
sensitive to exogenous shocks than that of Japan. In the formula used in Japan, when 
households move out and the houses become vacant, it is assumed that the rent stayed 
at the same price for a period until the next tenant. On the other hand, in the United 
States, in the case of moving-out, the index is to be estimated from other samples. 
Another difference is that unanticipated oil supply shocks cause a significant increase 
in the public transportation index in Japan, while the corresponding response in the US 
public transportation index is largely flat and statistically insignificant in all horizons.  
The response patterns of the food at home and fuels and utilities indexes to 
aggregate demand shocks appear rather similar between the United States and Japan. 
The shocks cause large sustained increases from initial levels and the responses are 
mostly statistically significant. The major difference is that in the United States, 
unanticipated aggregate demand expansion causes a significant increase in the shelter, 
housing furnishings and operations, and public transportation indexes. On the other 
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hand, in Japan, the responses of these indexes are not positive in almost all horizons. 
This difference may explain the result that the aggregate demand shocks shift the 
aggregate price index significantly upward in both countries, although the statistical 
significance reduces gradually in Japan.  
The similarity in the impulse response pattern to oil-specific demand shocks is 
evident in the fuels and utilities and private transportation indexes. Unanticipated 
oil-specific demand expansion results in a persistent and significant increase in the 
fuels and utilities index in both the United States and Japan. The shock also causes an 
upward shift in the private transportation index from initial levels. The response of the 
US private transportation index is positive in all horizons, while in Japan, the response 
is insignificant between the 15th and 23rd months and the 43rd month onwards.  
The following are the major differences in the responses of expenditure category 
prices between the United States and Japan, which may affect the development of the 
aggregate price index: In the United States, unanticipated oil-specific demand shocks 
bring a persistent decrease in the food at home, alcoholic beverages, food away from 
home, housing furnishings and operations, and other goods and services indexes. The 
response of the housing furnishings and operations index is statistically significant for 
all horizons. The responses of other indexes show statistical significance only after 
several months of the initial shocks. Interestingly, unlike in the United States, these 
price indexes do not go below the initial level in Japan. Unanticipated oil-specific 
demand expansion results in a sustained increase in the food at home and alcoholic 
beverages indexes. Although the stimulus effect reduces gradually, the indexes do not 
reduce below the initial level. Contrary to the United States, an increase in the 
oil-specific demand leads to a temporary rise in the food away from home, housing 
furnishings and operations, and other goods and services indexes, which reach the 
maximum level almost one year later, followed by a decline to the starting point. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
Based on a two-block structural VAR model proposed by Kilian and Park (2009), we 
investigated the dynamic effects of changes in oil price on expenditure category CPI 
for the United States and Japan. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to 
shed light on the transmission effects of oil price shocks on detailed CPI. 
The main findings of our study can be summarized in the following manner: 
First, we revealed that each expenditure category price index responded very 
differently to the same structural shock. Second, we found that whether changes in oil 
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price function as a positive stimulus or negative shock on the individual expenditure 
category prices also depends on what kind of underlying shock drives changes in oil 
price. Finally, we also revealed that the transmission mechanisms of higher oil price 
differ considerably between the United States and Japan. In other words, the manner in 
which changes in oil price affect each expenditure category price differ between the 
United States and Japan, and these differences may lead to differences in the response 
of aggregate prices in both countries to changes in oil price.  
The results of our study imply that the policymaker, specifically the central bank, 
needs to understand the origins of a given oil price increase as each shock may require 
different policy adjustments. For example, given an increase in oil price, the central 
bank would merely increase the interest rates if the oil price surge stems from a 
demand shock. However, in the case of an exogenous oil supply shock or oil-specific 
demand shock, the central bank must initially consider whether it should suppress 
inflation by increasing interest rate and accepting output loss or just ignore the ongoing 
inflation. If it chooses to suppress inflation, then it might consider how much it must 
increase the interest rates in order to prevent changes in oil price from passing directly 
into core inflation. Although, understanding the origins of a higher oil price is 
important in the central bank’s decision-making process, identifying the origin of 
shock is not easy. However, based on the fact that each expenditure category price 
responded very differently to the structural shocks and how the shocks affect each 
index also depends on the origins of the shocks, a category-level analysis may help 
policymakers to identify the source of the shocks. 
Although our two-block structural VAR model enabled us to conduct a detailed 
investigation of the transmission mechanisms of changes in oil price, it abstracts from 
possible time-variation in parameters in the model. Considering the length of our 
sample period (from December 1974 to December 2010), there is a possibility that 
structural breaks occurred in the global oil market or domestic economy. To cope with 
this problem, time-varying VAR models that take into consideration possible structural 
breaks are promising way to facilitate our understanding of the transmission 
mechanisms of oil price shocks. In addition, further research is necessary to make a 
monetary policy explanation fully convincing. Assessing the effects of oil price shocks 
on expenditure category prices in other countries is a topic worth investigating in a 
future research study. 
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Table 3.1: Data sources 
 
 
 
Variable Data source 
World Production of Oil Oil and Gas Journal 
World Industrial 
Production  
Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development(OECD) 
WTI crude oil price Federal Reserve Bank 
Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) for the United 
States 
Federal Reserve Economic Data 
Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) for Japan 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
 
 
 
  
Source: Oil and Gas Journal, Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development(OECD), Federal Reserve Bank, Federal Reserve Economic Data, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
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 Food and beverages
 Food at home
Obtained by excluding alcoholic beverages and eals
outside the home from food index
 Alcoholic beverages Alcoholic beverages
 Food away from home
Based on similarity in definition,  meals outside index
is used as a substitute
 Housing Housing
 Shelter
Based on similarity in definition, rent index is used as
a substitute
 Fuels and utilities
Based on similarity in definition, fuel, light & water
charges index is used as a substitute
 Household furnishings and operations
Obtained by summing repairs & maintenance index
and furniture & household utensils index
 Apparel Clothes & footwear
 Medical care Medical care
Medical care commodities
Obtained by medicines & health fortification and
medical supplies & appliances
Medical care services Medical services
 Transportation Transportation
 Public transportation Public transportation
 Private transportation Private transportation
 Communication Communication
 Education Education
The U.S. Japan
Based on similarity in definition, food index is used as a
substitute
Based on similarity in definition, culture & recreation
index is used as a substitute
 Recreation
 Other goods and services
Based on similarity in definition, miscellaneous index is
used as a substitute
Table 3.2: Expenditure category CPI of the United States and Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications 
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Figures 3.1: Cumulative responses of aggregate level CPI for the United States 
and Japan 
 
 
Notes: Estimation is based on models (3.1)–(3.3). The dotted lines represent 
two-standard error bands.  
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative responses of the food and beverages, food at home, 
alcoholic beverages, and food away from home indexes in the United States 
 
 
Notes: Estimation is based on models (3.1)–(3.3). The dotted lines represent 
two-standard error bands.  
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative responses of the housing, shelter, fuels and utilities and 
household furnishings and operations indexes in the United States 
 
 
Notes: Estimation is based on models (3.1)–(3.3). The dotted lines represent 
two-standard error bands.  
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Figure 3.4: Cumulative responses of the apparel, medical care, public 
transportation, and private transportation indexes in the United States 
 
  
Notes: Estimation is based on models (3.1)–(3.3). The dotted lines represent 
two-standard error bands.  
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Figure 3.5: Cumulative responses of the communication, education, recreation, 
and other goods and services indexes in the United States 
 
 
Notes: Estimation is based on models (3.1)–(3.3). The dotted lines represent 
two-standard error bands.  
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Figures 3.6: Cumulative responses of the food and beverages, food at home, 
alcoholic beverages, and food away from home indexes in Japan 
 
 
Notes: Estimation is based on models (3.1)–(3.3). The dotted lines represent 
two-standard error bands. 
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Figures 3.7: Cumulative responses of the housing, shelter, fuels and utilities, and 
household furnishings and operations indexes in Japan 
 
 
Notes: Estimation is based on models (3.1)–(3.3). The dotted lines represent 
two-standard error bands.  
 
 
  
Oil supply shock Aggregate demand shock Oil-specific demand shock 
58 
 
 Apparel
 Medical care
 Public transportation
 Private transportation
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43
-0.004
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43
-0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Cumulative responses of the apparel, medical care, public 
transportation, and private transportation indexes in Japan 
 
 
Notes: Estimation is based on models (3.1)–(3.3). The dotted lines represent 
two-standard error bands.  
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Figures 3.9: Cumulative responses of the communication, education, 
recreation, and other goods and services indexes in Japan 
 
 
Notes: Estimation is based on models (3.1)–(3.3). The dotted lines represent 
two-standard error bands.  
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